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ABSTRACT
Digital evidence needs to be made persistent so that it can be used
later. For citizen forensics, sometimes intelligence cannot or should
not be made persistent forever. In this position paper, we pro-
pose a form of snap forensics by defining an elastic duration of
evidence/intelligence validity. Explicitly declaring such a duration
could unify the treatment of both ephemeral intelligence and per-
sistent evidence towards more flexible storage to satisfy privacy
requirements.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Given wide-spread surveillance such as CCTV, every citizen is
empowered to collect forensic intelligence in some digital form, for
witness or for self-defence. Generally a forensics evidence require
persistence whenever it is needed later, which is not always the
case for citizens to maximally protect their privacy, i.e., their rights
to be forgotten. Here we propose to model the duration of evidence
explicitly so that one can differentiate persistent evidence from
ephemeral intelligence. The persistent evidence starts on the date
when it was collected, and never ends; the ephemeral intelligence,
on the other hand, would disappear after it has served the purpose.
There are also two types of persistent evidence, logged and live
evidence: the duration between when an evidence was created and
when it was collected must be sufficiently short for live forensics.
Notice that for practical reasons the duration of persistent evi-
dence is not forever either. It may be necessary to change how long
the evidence is stored. E.g., for regulatory compliance, it may need
to be stored for 7 years and can then be deleted, but if it becomes
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involved in a criminal prosecution, it may need to be stored until
the full sentence is served or all appeals have been concluded –
which could mean 30 years or more.
2 MOTIVATION
In Feb 2017, UK National Rails announced a public consultation
plan to introducing biometric authentications such as fingerprints
or iris scan, as part of digital transformation to replace the current
paper ticket-based system at the turnstile gates [8]. For passengers,
the proposed changes could make the travel more efficient and
enhance user experience; for business stakeholders, the conductor
is no longer needed in the new approach to verify tickets on the
trains, which could achieve “driver-only trains”.
However, fingerprints or iris scans are typical biometrics that our
pioneer forensic scientists such as Edmond Locard has proposed
the exchange principle, according to which the perpetrator of a
crime will bring something into the crime scene and leave with
something from it, and that both can be used as forensic evidence.
The difference is that, in Locard’s world, there is always physical
contact between the objects. In our digital world, there need not
be physical contact - but we choose to record something about a
person or object without making contact. His principle does not
always hold in the digital world. Given biometric data could carry
personal information that could uniquely identify the owner, it is in
our view quiet risky for users to give them away to non-authorities.
These motivate us to consider tighter control of ephemeral intelli-
gence, even if they were used for legitimate authentication purposes
for the case of biometric scan, or end of lost from unrecoverable per-
sistent storage. Another motivating example is the missing MH370
which suggests the use of a live forensic recorder [9] of ephemeral
intelligence of flight data that otherwise may not be recovered as
persistent evidence from the physical FDR.
3 LIVE FORENSICS VERSUS SNAP FORENSICS
A more general problem is inspired from the motivating example.
According to traditional forensic science, evidence about an incident
at the crime scene, according to Locard’s Exchange Principle, is trace
left found. However, when the incident happens, one may not be
able to find the traces any more. For example, in network forensics,
the network packets come and go, they may not be kept all the
time. Runtime collection of such ephemeral evidence requires one
to prepare them proactively [3, 4], hence the concept of "forensic
readiness" - having organisations and systems prepared to capture
and analyse potential evidence.
Previously we have proposed to monitor the environment of
the system [7] to diagnose problems and switch to the right so-
lutions [5]. The notion of keeping the log of software systems to
diagnosing their failures could be extended to digital forensic ev-
idence collection: to collect and use valid evidence, one needs to
associate each item with a life cycle of validity. We need to keep
three time stamps minimal to signify the creation t0, observation t1,
and the modification t2 events associated with the evidence, while
t ≥ t0 is the time of assessing the evidence.
Definition 3.1 (Persistent, Live, and Snap intelligence). Given two
finite numbers τ1 and τ2, an evidence is persistent if t2 = ∞; an
evidence is live if t1 − t0 < τ1; an evidence is snap if t2 − t1 < τ2.
As discussed earlier, the acquisition τ1 and retention τ2 durations
may be adaptable and changed to meet dynamic needs of satisfying
forensic requirements. It is important that forensic evidence is not
changed during [t1, t2). If t2 = ∞, the evidence will last forever,
or fully persistent. Of course that is ideal, but as long as t2 > t , at
the time of investigation the evidence is valid. It is relatively easy
to obtain persistent evidence from persistent storage (disks) with
respect to file systems; however, it is much harder to guarantee
persistence for network packets because without keeping them on
to persistent storage the network packet will get lost.
The liveness of evidence is guaranteed by a small τ1. As long as
it is small, within short period of the incident, the data describing
the incident is already received so that the evidence collection is
on the fly, and the forensic analysis is in time to catch problems
earlier, and to avoid disasters. In the MH370 incident the missing
Boeing 777 is never found, suggesting that evidence needs to be
collected proactively. Live blackboxes [9] were proposed to keep
track of the aircraft in motion so that their flight data records
could be retrieved in real-time (with less than 1 minute delay),
to avoid similar incidents like MH370 by reporting evidence of
potential incidents to the authorities earlier. The passwords stored
by software managers are another form of ephemeral intelligence,
where the master password in transient memory may be revealed
by unexpected failure of the software system. To reduce the risk of
exposing themaster passwords, the in-memory plain text passwords
should never last long [1]. Live forensic evidence could be combined
with persistence storage in order to preserve them in the long run,
while typically the storages are remote from the data generators.
Finally, some evidence concerning personal information requires
a small τ2 in order to reduce the risks of leaking personal informa-
tion of users. One example is SnapChat, whose selling point is to
destroy the photos of users within 24 hours. The day-return train
ticket, e.g., is another good example whereby the biometric data as
evidence of purchase could only last for at most one day.
4 CALL FOR ACTION
Saving evidence as persistent data allows someone re-purposing
them without users’ consent, violating privacy requirements of
users; yet as a trade off, one needs to make the ephemeral intel-
ligence last till being used as evidence for proactive or reactive
investigations. Inspired by the success of SnapChat, we define snap
forensics: instead of making ephemeral evidence fully persistent
since t1, we need to make the privacy sensitive evidence (e.g. bio-
metric) transient again as early as possible, with τ2 = t2 − t1 small.
In case one cannot predict how long evidence needs to exist in order
for it to be used in an investigation, the incidents which require
investigation may not be discovered within the short time periods
proposed. Therefore, for investigative purposes, t2 should be as
large as possible. Storing the features of fingerprints in blockchains,
a prototype implementation FingerBlox 1 seems to be the right di-
rection to go. It highlights how a fingerprint could be scanned using
an Android app and stored as featured points (rather than the raw
fingerprints) into the distributed ledgers. The fact that blockchains
are tamper-proof helps achieve both persistence and snap forensic
requirements, while keeping users privacy into account as well.
Due to the slow proof-of-work of blockchain technology, the live
forensic requirements may not be accommodated easily though.
Another promising biometric authentication solution is called con-
tinuous authentication [2], where by the biometric pulses of fingers
are augmented to the initial measure to incrementally improve the
accuracy of authentication.
5 CONCLUSION
By introducing time-stamps based definitions, we differentiate per-
sistence, live, and snap intelligence as temporal forensic require-
ments, in relation to various security and privacy requirements for
biometric authentication, sensitive data protection (e.g., passwords
and social relationships). Using the recent examples we demon-
strate that live forensics may be inevitable and useful for tracking
Internet of Things whose states change continuously. We also show
that snap forensics may be made more privacy-friendly by a careful
design of the mechanism. Currently we are working with UK Po-
lice to implement part of the solution on social-lift.com, a platform
to support snap forensics by limiting the verifiable and selective
disclosure of users’ personal information on social media [6].
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